New Algorithms for Contextual Bandits

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Serving Content to Users

Query, IP address, browser properties, etc.

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result (ie. ad, news story)

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context x_t

action j_t

reward $r_{i_t}(t)$

Outline

- **Formally define the setting.**

- Show ideas that fail.

- Give a high probability optimal algorithm.

- Dealing with VC sets.

- Linear Payoff Functions.

- Slates.

The Setting

- T rounds, K possible actions, N policies π in Π (context → actions)

- for t=1 to T
  - world commits to rewards $\mathbf{r(t)}=r_1(t),r_2(t),\ldots,r_K(t)$
  - world provides context x_t
  - learner's policies recommend $\pi_1(x_t), \pi_2(x_t), \ldots, \pi_N(x_t)$
  - learner chooses action j_t
  - learner receives reward $r_{j_t}(t)$

- want to compete with following the best policy in hindsight

Regret

- reward of algorithm A: $G_A(T) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} r_{j_t}(t)$

- expected reward of policy i: $G_i(T) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \pi_i(x_t) \cdot r(t)$

- algorithm A's regret: $\max_i G_i(T) - G_A(T)$

Regret

- algorithm A's regret: $\max_i G_i(T) - G_A(T)$

- expected regret: $\max_i G_i(T) - E[G_A(T)]$

- high probability regret: $P[\max_i G_i(T) - G_A(T) > \varepsilon] \leq \delta$

Some Observations

- This is harder than supervised learning. In our setting we do not know the rewards of actions not taken.

- This is not the traditional K-armed bandit setting. In the traditional bandit setting there is no context (or experts).
  - In the simpler K-armed bandit setting, there is no context. We just compete with best arm in hindsight.
  - The traditional setting is akin to showing everyone the same advertisement, article, etc.

Previous Results

Algorithm	Regret	High Prob?	Context?
Exp4 [ACFS '02]	$\tilde{O}(KT \ln(N))^{1/2}$	No	Yes
ε-greedy, epoch-geedy [LZ '07]	$\tilde{O}((K \ln(N)^{1/3})T^{2/3})$	Yes	Yes
Exp3.P[ACFS '02] UCB [Auer '00]	$\tilde{O}(KT)^{1/2}$	Yes	No

$\Omega\left(\sqrt{KT}\right)$ lower bound [ACFS '02]

Our Result

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Exp4.P [BLLRS '10]	$\tilde{O}(K \ln(N/\delta)T)^{1/2}$	Yes	Yes

$$\Omega\left(\sqrt{KT}\right) \text{lower bound} \quad \text{[ACFS '02]}$$

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First Some Failed Approaches

- **Bad idea 1:** Maintain a set of plausible hypotheses and randomize uniformly over their predicted actions.

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- **Bad idea 2:** Maintain a set of plausible hypotheses and randomize uniformly among the hypothesis.

  - Adversary has two actions, one always paying off 1 and the other 0. If all but one of > 2T hypothesis always predict wrong arm, and only 1 hypothesis always predicts good arm, with probability > ½ it is never picked and algorithm incurs regret of T.

epsilon-greedy

- Rough idea of ε-greedy (or ε-first): act randomly for ε rounds, then go with best (arm or expert).

- Even if we know the number of rounds in advance, epsilon-first won't get us regret $O(T)^{1/2}$, even in the non-contextual setting.

- Rough analysis: even for just 2 arms, we suffer regret: $\varepsilon + (T-\varepsilon)/(\varepsilon^{1/2})$.
  - $\varepsilon = T^{2/3}$ is optimal.
  - gives regret $T^{2/3}$

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Ideas Behind Exp4.P

- **exponential weights**
  - keep a weight on each expert that drops exponentially in the expert's (estimated) performance

- **upper confidence bounds**
  - use an upper confidence bound on each expert's estimated reward

- **ensuring exploration**
  - make sure each action is taken with some minimum probability

- **importance weighting**
  - give rare events more importance to keep estimates unbiased

Exponential Weight Algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation with Experts

(EXP4) [Auer et al. '95]

(slide from Beygelzimer & Langford ICML 2010 tutorial)

Initialization: $\forall \pi \in \Pi : w_t(\pi) = 1$

For each $t = 1, 2, \ldots$:

1. Observe x_t and let for $a = 1, \ldots, K$

$$p_t(a) = (1 - Kp_{\min}) \frac{\sum_\pi \mathbf{1}[\pi(x_t) = a] \, w_t(\pi)}{\sum_\pi w_t(\pi)} + p_{\min},$$

where $p_{\min} = \sqrt{\frac{\ln |\Pi|}{KT}}$.

2. Draw a_t from p_t, and observe reward $r_t(a_t)$.

3. Update for each $\pi \in \Pi$

$$w_{t+1}(\pi) = \begin{cases} w_t(\pi) \exp\left(p_{\min} \frac{r_t(a_t)}{p_t(a_t)}\right) & \text{if } \pi(x_t) = a_t \\ w_t(\pi) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Exponential Weight Algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation with Experts

(Exp4.P) [Beygelzimer, Langford, Li, R, Schapire '10]

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where $p_{\min} = \sqrt{\frac{\ln |\Pi|}{KT}}$.

2. Draw a_t from p_t, and observe reward $r_t(a_t)$.

3. Update for each $\pi \in \Pi$

$$w_{t+1}(\pi) = w_t(\pi) \exp \left(\frac{p_{\min}}{2} \left(\mathbf{1}[\pi(x_t) = a_t] \frac{r_t(a_t)}{p_t(a_t)} + \frac{1}{p_t(\pi(x_t))} \sqrt{\frac{\ln N/\delta}{KT}} \right) \right)$$

Why Should This Work?

$$w_i(t+1) = w_i(t) \exp\left(\frac{\sqrt{\ln N}}{2\sqrt{KT}} \left(\hat{g}_i(t) + \hat{z}_i(t) \sqrt{\frac{\ln(N/\delta)}{KT}} \right) \right)$$

Why Should This Work?

$$w_i(t+1) \quad = \quad w_i(t) \exp\left(\frac{\sqrt{\ln N}}{2\sqrt{KT}}\left(\hat{y}_i(t) + \hat{v}_i(t)\sqrt{\frac{\ln(N/\delta)}{KT}}\right)\right)$$

$$\sim \sum_i^T \hat{y}_i(t) + \sqrt{\ln(N/\delta)/KT} \sum_i^T \hat{v}_i(t)$$

$$\sim \hat{G}_i + \sqrt{\ln(N/\delta)}\hat{\sigma}_i$$

$$\geq G_i \text{ w.p. } \geq 1-\delta$$

using a martingale inequality

Proof Outline

so we have $\qquad \hat{G}_i + \sqrt{\ln(N/\delta)}\hat{\sigma}_i \geq G_i \text{ w.p. } \geq 1 - \delta$

Proof Outline

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letting $\quad \hat{U} = \max_i \left(\hat{G}_i + \sqrt{\ln(N/\delta)}\hat{\sigma}_i \right)$

by looking at $\quad \ln(W_{T+1}/W_1)$

we can show $\quad G_{\text{Exp4.P}} \geq (1 - 2\sqrt{K \ln N / T})\hat{U} - \ln(N/\delta)$
$$-2\sqrt{KT \ln N} - \sqrt{KT \ln(N/\delta)}$$

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$$\hat{G}_i + \sqrt{\ln(N/\delta)}\hat{\sigma}_i \geq G_i \text{ w.p. } \geq 1 - \delta$$

and

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and
$$G_{\text{Exp4.P}} \geq (1 - 2\sqrt{K \ln N / T})\hat{U} - \ln(N/\delta)$$
$$- 2\sqrt{KT \ln N} - \sqrt{KT \ln(N/\delta)}$$

implies
$$G_{\text{Exp4.P}} \geq G_{\max} - O\!\left(\sqrt{KT \ln(N/\delta)}\right) \text{w.p.} \, 1 - \delta$$

Exp4P beats epslion-greedy in practice [BLLRS '10] and performs negligibly worse (on average) than Exp4.

One Problem…

- This algorithm requires keeping explicit weights on the policies.
  - Okay for polynomially many policies.
  - Okay for some special cases.
  - Not efficient in general.

- Want an efficient algorithm that would (for example) work with an ERM Oracle
  - epoch-greedy [Langford and Zhang '07] has this property.

Results

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Infinitely Many Policies

- What if we have an infinite number of policies?

- Our bound of $\tilde{O}(K \ln(N)T)^{1/2}$ becomes vacuous.

- If we assume our policy class has a finite VC dimension d, then we can tackle this problem.

- Need i.i.d. assumption. We will also assume k=2 to illustrate the argument.

VC Dimension

- The VC dimension of a hypothesis class captures the class's expressive power.

- It is the cardinality of the largest set (in our case, of contexts) the class can shatter.
  - Shatter means to label in all possible configurations.

VE, an Algorithm for VC Sets

The VE algorithm [Beygelzimer, Langford, Li, R, Schapire '10] :

- Act uniformly at random for τrounds.

- This partitions our policies Π into equivalence classes according to their labelings of the first τexamples.

- Pick one representative from each equivalence class to make Π'.

- Run Exp4.P on Π'.

Outline of Analysis of VE

- Sauer's lemma bounds the number of equivalence classes to $(e\tau/d)^d$.
  - Hence, using Exp4.P bounds, VE's regret to Π' is $\approx \tau + O(Td \ln(\tau))$

- We can show that the regret of Π' to Π is $\approx (T/\tau)(d\ln T)$
  - by looking at the probability of disagreeing on future data given agreement for τ steps.

- $\tau \approx (Td \ln 1/\delta)^{1/2}$ achieves the optimal trade-off.

- Gives $\tilde{O}(Td)^{1/2}$ regret.

- Still inefficient!

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When Do Efficient Algorithms Exist?

- One example is the linear payoff functions setting.

- In this setting, on each round, we observe a d dimensional context (feature vector) for each arm.
  - Equivalent to the contextual bandit setting.

- We assume there exists an unknown vector, whose dot product with each arm feature gives the expected regret of that arm.
  - Similar to a realizability assumption.

Linear Payoffs

- LinRel [Auer '02] gives a polynomial time algorithm with $\tilde{O}(Td)^{1/2}$ regret.

- LinRel tries to estimate the reward of the current round by looking at past rounds.
  - LinRel decomposes the feature vector of the current round into a linear combination of feature vectors seen on previous rounds.
  - Looks at previous rewards to compute coefficients.
  - Uses these estimates to compute reward estimates.

- Matches the $\Omega(Td)^{1/2}$ lower bound [Chu, Li, R, Schapire '10] up to log factors.

- LinUCB (a similar algorithm to LinRel) outperforms epsilon-greedy on Yahoo! Homepage data. [Li, Chu, Langford, Schapire '10].

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Slates

Slates

- Oftentimes, we have to choose multiple actions (without replacement).

- Different models:
  - All slots equal.
  - Positional factors.
  - Interaction via "properties."

Slates

- For T time steps, K actions, s slots, N experts choosing slates, we can get the following regret bounds [Kale, R, Schapire '10]:
  - $O((sKT\ln N)^{1/2})$ for unordered slates
  - $O(s(KT\ln N)^{1/2})$ for ordered slates

- Beats a straightforward reduction to Exp4.

- Uses a variant of multiplicative weights.

- Not efficient.

Summary

- Described Exp4P, the first optimal high probability algorithm for the contextual bandit problem.

- Showed how to compete with a VC-Set.

- Discussed an efficient linear-payoff algorithm.

- Introduced the slates problem.

Open Problems

- <u>Main Open Problem</u>: Find an efficient optimal algorithm for the contextual bandits problem!

- i.e. make the Exp4P algorithm efficient with an ERM (Empirical Risk Minimization) oracle.
  - Instead of updating weights explicitly for each policy, feed rewards for actions into an oracle, which can return a good policy.
  - This oracle could be a standard efficient learning algorithm.

Open Problems

- Find good classes of policies for contextual bandit problems. Linear policies seem to do well…

- Get rid of the realizability assumption in LinRel or LinUCB for linear payoffs.

- Deal with interaction in slates!

- More experimental evaluation.